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1.  Introduction 
 
The rise in total spending by central and local governments was one of the most 
profound economic changes of the twentieth century (S.J. Evenett, 2000). This is 
consistent with Public Finance theory as propounded by Wagner (1863) and Baumol 
(1967) - an increase in GDP is accompanied by an increasing role of the state in 
maintaining law and order, providing essential services like education and health and 
contributing to other significant economic activities. This also means that the 
government in its various forms – central and sub-central as well as state-owned 
enterprises - spends a considerable sum of money on procuring goods and services in 
keeping with its growing responsibilities. Typically, figures for government 
procurement range from 10 to 15 per cent of GDP across countries. The OECD (2002) 
estimates that government procurement (inclusive of defence and compensation of 
employees) accounts for almost 20 per cent of GDP in OECD countries and between 9 
and 20 per cent of GDP in developing countries. An immediate implication is that 
through procurement, the state has a huge influence over the allocation of resources 
in market economies. An important aspect of this is the preponderance of domestic 
suppliers in meeting the procurement requirements of governments throughout much 
of the post-World War II period, possibly suggesting that public procurement acts as 
a non-tariff barrier to trade.      
 
The procurement literature has used the theory of auctions and asymmetric 
information to develop models that show that discrimination may be necessary to 
minimize average procurement costs1. Moreover, minimizing procurement costs is 
not the only argument in the government’s objective function. Governments are also 
saddled with political economy considerations and other non-economic objectives like 
                                                 
1 For instance see McAfee & McMillan (1989), Laffont & Tirole (1991), Rothenberg (1993), Branco (1994), Breton 
& Salmon (1995) and Chen (1995). 
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the promotion of domestic industry, encouraging the transfer of technology, 
promoting small, medium and artisan firms and state enterprises, and the promotion 
of national security. This means that goods and services may not always be bought 
from the least-cost or most efficient supplier, further embedding discrimination in 
public procurement.     
 
However, even if discrimination is an optimal policy outcome, the net welfare benefits 
are likely to be modest. Rather, the cost savings for procuring entities and greater 
profits for domestic firms that favouritism generates will tend to be offset by 
increased average prices (Deltas and Evenett, 1997). Moreover, the optimal 
discriminating mechanism is specific to the underlying conditions, so that even small 
deviations can eliminate any gains. On the other hand, studies have shown that cost 
savings through competitive bidding are in the range of 30% (Transparency 
International, 1997; World Bank, 1994).      
 
This pragmatic argument in favour of non-discrimination is the cornerstone on which 
most international disciplines on government procurement are based. These measures 
include efforts undertaken by the EC as a part of its internal market reform and 
deregulation programmes, disciplines already present and those being negotiated in 
various preferential trade agreements, and the non-binding proposals of the APEC 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law (United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law). Arguably, the most important of such initiatives has been the WTO’s 
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
In this paper, we examine whether the GPA has been able to increase non-
discriminatory procurement by looking at the pattern of public purchases in two 
countries – Japan and Switzerland – since the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
GPA (URGPA). The choice of countries in this analysis was primarily determined by 
data availability. Both countries have submitted detailed procurement data 
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consistently since the URGPA, in a form that is amenable to the statistical analysis. 
But there were other considerations as well: both are large open services-intensive 
economies (services account for 75% of GDP) and both have large governments, 
federal and sub-federal. The average share of total government expenditure in GDP 
over 1996-2002 was almost 50% in Japan and 37% in Switzerland. 
Data on government procurement was assembled from these countries’ submissions 
to the WTO’s Committee on Government Procurement. Shingal (2002) and Evenett 
and Shingal (2006) analyzed this data in the case of Japan and found that the 
compliance mechanisms of the GPA “failed to prevent reductions in foreign 
penetration to Japan's state procurement markets.” The analysis was undertaken for 
both goods and services contracts awarded up to 1999 and concluded that “the 
proportion of total contracts awarded to foreigners in 1998 and 1999 was lower than 
in 1990 and 1991. In the absence of these changes, the value of contracts awarded to 
foreign firms would have been approximately 25 percent higher in 1998 and 1999.” In 
this paper, we build on this earlier work by developing new metrics, extending the 
period of analysis and focusing exclusively on services procurement. 
Our results indicate that, at least for these two countries, foreign market access in 
services procurement has not increased through the 1990s since the coming into effect 
of the GPA. In fact, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have 
declined over 1996/97-2002/03 for both countries and in the absence of this decline, 
the value of services contracts awarded to foreign firms would have been more than 
15 times higher in the case of Japan and nearly 68 times more in the case of 
Switzerland! We also find that for the same services categories, the Japanese 
government is not purchasing as much from abroad as its private sector, a finding 
that further points to the home-bias in that government's public purchase decisions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the GPA, including the 
scope of the Agreement and the availability of data that forms the basis of the analysis 
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in the paper. Section 3 looks at the methodology employed while Section 4 analyzes 
the individual country procurement patterns of the two countries in our sample and 
discusses the evolution of counterfactuals over time and in comparison with the 
private sector. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The GPA and foreign procurement of services 
 
2.1.  The background: The GPA is a plurilateral agreement that was first 
negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1973-79) and 
came into effect on January 1, 1981. A 1987 Protocol amended the Tokyo Round 
Procurement Code and the new version entered into force on January 1, 1988. The 
GPA, as it stands today, was negotiated in parallel with the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT and came into effect on January 1, 1996. The URGPA has 40 Contracting Parties 
as its signatories2. Article XIX: 5 of the GPA requires that all Contracting Parties 
report data on procurement by government entities to the Committee on Government 
Procurement. This data pertains to the value and the number of contracts awarded by 
government procuring entities to winning suppliers who bid for them through one of 
the three procurement practices outlined in the Agreement – open tendering, selective 
tendering and limited tendering. The GPA requires that only procurement above a 
certain threshold value be subject to international competitive bidding.  
 
2. 2. Scope and Coverage of the Agreement: The GPA does not apply to all 
government procurement undertaken by its Contracting Parties. The Annexes of the GPA 
                                                 
2 This list includes Canada, the European Community and its 27 constituents, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States. In addition, Albania, 
Armenia, China, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman and Panama are in the process of 
negotiating their accession to the GPA. The list primarily comprises developed countries with Australia and New 
Zealand being notable exceptions; most developing and all LDCs have chosen not to be a part of the GPA. 
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outline government entities3 and purchases of goods and services that are potentially 
disciplined by the Agreement. The GPA applies only to entities listed in Appendix 1 of the 
Agreement. This contains five Annexes for each signatory. Annex 1 lists covered central 
government entities; Annex 2 lists sub-central government entities; and Annex 3 is a “catch-
all” category that lists all other entities (such as utilities) that procure in accordance with the 
provisions of the GPA. Annex 4 lists covered services, and Annex 5 covered construction 
services. In addition, the URGPA’s requirement of international competitive bidding does not 
apply to all procurement by the covered entities. Coverage depends on whether the value of the 
procurement is at or above a certain threshold.  
 
Thresholds differ depending on the type of procurement and on the level of government 
making the purchase and are stated in terms of the IMF’s accounting unit, the SDR.  For 
Annex 1 central government entities, the threshold values are SDR 130,000 for procurement of 
goods and services and SDR 5 million for procurement of construction services. For Annex 2 
sub-central government entities, the thresholds are SDR 200,000 for goods and services, 
(except for the United States and Canada which apply a SDR 355,000 threshold) and SDR 5 
million for construction services (with the exception of Japan and the South Korea, which 
apply a SDR 15 million threshold). For Annex 3 entities, the threshold values are SDR 400,000 
for goods and services (with the exception that the United States applies a US$ 250,000 
threshold for federally owned utilities) and SDR 5 million for construction services (barring 
Japan and Korea, which apply a threshold of SDR 15 million). Additionally, the General Notes 
of individual signatories may specify higher thresholds for particular Contracting Parties in a 
bid to ensure reciprocity.4 Exceptions from the obligations of the Agreement are allowed for 
developing countries in certain situations outlined in Article V of the URGPA while general 
exceptions are contained in Article XXIII5.  
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the term ‘entity’ is not defined anywhere in the GPA, thus reflecting the absence of consensus on 
what constitutes a public undertaking or entity as well as paving the way for discretion on the part of Contracting 
Parties in meeting their commitments under the Agreement. 
4 The threshold can be different for different participants in the bid as is the case with the US' commitments on the 
procurement of construction services by Annex 2 & 3 entities vis-a-vis Korean suppliers. The threshold specified for 
construction services for Annex 2 and 3 entities in the US’ government procurement commitments is SDR 5 million, 
but for Korean construction services and their suppliers, the threshold is SDR 15 million.  
5 According to this Article, these measures should not be applied in a manner that would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where similar conditions prevail or a disguised restriction 
on international trade. 
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 2. 3. Data and their availability: Statistics submitted by the signatories to the 
WTO Secretariat are the primary source of data. Article XIX: 5 of the GPA requires 
that Contracting Parties submit procurement-related data to the Committee on 
Government Procurement. Article XIX:5(a) of the URGPA requires the submission of 
information on the value of contracts awarded both above and below the threshold. 
Article XIX:5(b) requires data on procurement above the threshold to be classified by 
procuring entities and by goods and services according to the nationality of the 
winning supplier irrespective of whether the supplier is located in a Contracting Party 
to the GPA. Data also needs to be provided on the use of limited tendering practices 
broken down by entity and by categories of goods and services (Article XIX:5(c)) and 
on derogations from the principles of Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment 
(Article XIX:5(d)).  
 
Unfortunately, only half of the 40 Contracting Parties (Canada, EU-15, Hong Kong , 
Japan, Norway and the United States) have made statistical submissions regularly 
since the URGPA came into being (details provided in Annex Table 1).6 Even amongst 
these, there are significant differences, both in terms of what is included and how it is 
included, and the need for consistency, has thus determined the choice of sample 
countries for the analysis that follows. A point to note also is the seriousness with 
which Contracting Parties to the GPA have met their commitments under Article XIX: 
5, with almost half of the membership not making this information available, either at 
all or consistently over time. In the absence of any enforcement mechanism related to 
data requirements or any punitive action/public censure for non-submission, 
Contracting Parties seem not to have taken their responsibilities in this regard very 
                                                 
6 Data on government procurement is also available for certain years from 1981 onwards for Austria, Sweden, 
Finland (before they became Members of the EC), Singapore, Israel, and the European Communities. One standard 
observation is that submissions were not as detailed in the 1980s as they have been since the 1990s. Moreover, since 
1997, Canada, the EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway and the US have submitted data almost every year. Switzerland 
has not provided data beyond 2003 while Korea, Singapore, Liechtenstein and Taiwan have only done so for 2002-
04, 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009, respectively. 
 8  
seriously. Submitting data on procurement is one of the best ways of ensuring 
transparency in public procurement and highlighting any break in trend in public 
purchase decisions that signals discrimination.  
 
One problem in making inter-temporal comparisons is that different procurement 
codes were applicable in different time periods and these necessitated different data 
requirements. For instance, the Tokyo Round procurement code did not require data 
to be reported on the value and number of contracts awarded under derogations to 
the GPA. Furthermore, prior to the Uruguay Round procurement code, the scope of 
the GPA was limited to goods alone and to those services that were incidental to the 
procurement of such goods. With the Uruguay Round, the scope of the GPA was 
expanded to explicitly incorporate services (including construction services) and as 
such, data from before 1996 refers to goods alone while that post-1996 involves both 
goods and services. This imposes an additional challenge in the analysis of services 
procurement7.    
 
3.  Methodology 
 
The GPA promises two major potential benefits for its signatories: the transparency 
requirements and the competition the GPA induces result in the public receiving 
better value for money on government procurement activities, and the increase in 
exports resultant from improved market access offers the prospect of greater profits 
for foreign supplying firms. In what follows, we examine whether market access has 
actually increased by undertaking an economic analysis of the statistical submissions. 
                                                 
7 As noted above, the GPA requires that Contracting Parties submit data on the number and value of contracts 
awarded both above and below the threshold. However, while the above threshold figures need to be classified as 
goods or services, below the threshold no breakdown is required. This means that it becomes difficult to examine 
how goods or services contracts awarded above threshold have changed as a proportion of total goods or total 
services contracts, as the case may be. 
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The methodology compares actual outcomes against two counterfactuals, one against 
time, and the other against the private sector.    
 
For the purpose of these counterfactuals, we define the following metrics: 
• The value of above-threshold (AT) contracts as a proportion of all contracts  
• The value of contracts awarded to foreigners (FP) as a proportion of total above-threshold 
contracts 
• The value of contracts awarded using non-limited tendering (Non-LT) methods as a 
proportion of total above-threshold contracts8  
 
These metrics give an idea of how governments might be using their procurement 
practices to restrict market access. Governments can, for instance, split contracts to 
keep them below GPA thresholds and this would be reflected in the declining share of 
AT contracts in total procurement. Governments may also choose to award fewer 
contracts to foreign suppliers or to award them mostly by limited tendering methods, 
which would limit the size of procurement open to international competition. Thus, 
the value of contracts above threshold awarded using non-limited tendering methods 
would serve as a measure of international competition in procurement or an indicator 
of the volume of procurement subject to international competitive bidding (ICB). This 
would be a measure of the potential openness in procurement markets. On the other 
hand, the value of above threshold contracts actually awarded to foreigners would 
measure the actual extent of foreign procurement (FP) and reflect the de facto openness 
in procurement markets.  
 
To develop the counterfactual against time, we calculate the potential value of 
contracts in period ‘t’ by multiplying the actual value of contracts in period ‘t’ by a 
metric in period ‘t-1.’ If the metric in period ‘t-1’ was greater than that in period ‘t,’ 
                                                 
8 Contract data is not further disaggregated into selective tendering procedures to enable additional counterfactual 
analysis by this metric. 
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which would be the case with metrics that declined over time, the potential value 
would exceed the actual value and the difference can be read as the unrealized market 
access associated with that metric.  
 
We thus define: 
 
itititit ATfpfpUFP *)( 1 −= −  
where  
UFPit = Unrealized foreign market access in the “i”th service category in year “t”  
fpit-1 = Share of foreign procurement in above-threshold procurement in the “i”th 
service category in year “t-1” and similarly for year “t”    
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
 
And,  
 
itititit ATnonLTnonLTUICB *)( 1 −= −  
where  
UICBit = Unrealized internationally competitive bidding in the “i”th service category 
in year “t”  
nonLTit-1 = Share of non-limited tender contracts by value in above-threshold 
procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t-1” and similarly for year “t”    
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
 
An implicit assumption in this methodology is with respect to the choice of the base 
period. Given that our methodology attempts to carry out an ex-post impact 
assessment of the GPA in terms of market access, the base period should ideally pre-
date the coming into effect of the GPA. However, since the data coverage of services 
in the GPA began only with the URGPA, the second best alternative is to consider as 
 11  
base a period just after the URGPA came into effect as market access in this initial 
period is unlikely to be affected by the disciplining mechanisms of the GPA. The use 
of our methodology is thus based on the premise that by the later years of our sample 
period, the disciplining mechanisms of the GPA would have had time to have a 
positive impact on market access in services procurement. 
 
A limitation of this methodology, however, is that it assumes constant all other factors 
that may be responsible for a change in the metrics. A change in domestic or foreign 
production structures, for instance, could lead to a re-orientation towards domestic 
suppliers. The change could also be dictated by macroeconomic factors such as a 
recession or by reasons of political economy such as governments being in an election 
cycle. If we could actually hold all these other factors constant, procurement would be 
characterized by declining metrics over time only if governments chose to restrict 
market access on purpose. Since we cannot make such corrections, however, our 
results must be considered more as suggestive than conclusive. This said, as we shall 
see below, the deviations from counterfactuals in our analyses are large enough in 
magnitude to suggest quite strongly that the disciplines of the GPA have not been a 
binding force in ensuring non-discrimination in the award of services contracts. 
 
Another way of illustrating any home-bias in government procurement is by 
comparing import intensities in the public and private sectors for the same services 
categories. The theoretical justification for this comparison is provided by Baldwin 
(1970, 1984) who shows that in a Hecksher-Ohlin model with a home-bias in 
government procurement, the reduction in imports from the government is 
compensated by a corresponding increase in the imports of the private sector9. For the 
second counterfactual, therefore, the comparator used is the private sector and the 
intuition involves simulating the effect of private-sector importing practices in public 
                                                 
9 Miyagawa (1991) extends Baldwin’s “neutrality proposition” to an oligopolistic model.   
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purchase decisions. Given that private sector efficiency is a benchmark for most 
governments, such a comparison is perfectly appropriate.  
 
While constructing this counterfactual, we assume that all other variables that have a 
bearing on public and private purchase decisions remain constant or affect these 
decisions identically. We simulate the effect of private-sector decision-making in 
public procurement decisions by using private sector import intensities in the share of 
total government procurement in each service category which is above-threshold and 
hence, potentially subject to ICB. This provides an estimate of the "foreign 
procurement" in each service category which would have been "undertaken" by the 
private sector had it been making government procuring decisions. From this we 
subtract the actual value of the foreign procurement undertaken by the government in 
each service category to get a differential, which is termed as the Private-Public 
Purchase Differential (PPPD). 
 
We thus define: 
 
itit
it
it FPAT
od
MPPPD −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= *
Pr
 
 
where  
PPPDit = Private-public purchase differential in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
(M/Prod)it = Ratio of imports to gross output in the “i”th service category in year “t”    
ATit = Value of above-threshold procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t”     
FPit = Value of foreign procurement in the “i”th service category in year “t” 
 
A positive PPPD indicates that if the public sector had applied the private sector 
import share in that service category, foreign procurement would have exceeded 
actual levels in it, which suggests a home-bias in government procurement.    
 13  
4. Analyses of Country Services Procurement Patterns 
 
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the procurement patterns in Japan and Switzerland over the 
period 1997-2003. The AT/Total (above- & below-threshold) procurement shares are low in 
both countries (averaging 33% in Japan and 27.5% in Switzerland), which, prima facie, 
constricts the contestable procurement market in both countries. While these shares have fallen 
over time in Japan, Switzerland shows more fluctuations and a virtual reversion in 2003 to the 
1997 share. Focusing on services procured above threshold, these average more than 60% of 
total AT procurement in both countries and these shares have also risen over time. However as 
a share of total above- & below-threshold procurement, the shares of services procured above 
threshold are much lower in both countries and less than 20% in the case of Switzerland. The 
shares of Non-LT in AT services procurement have been high in both countries, averaging 
70% in Japan and 80% in Switzerland, but these have also fallen over time in both countries, 
considerably in the case of Switzerland from 86 to 68%. Thus, for both these countries, prima 
facie, the share of the market open to unimpeded international competition has shrunk. The 
share of foreign procurement in AT services procurement has been very low in Japan, 
averaging 1.4% over 1997-2003, and relatively higher in Switzerland with an average of 4.4% 
over 1997-2002, without showing huge fluctuations around this mean. However, the Swiss 
share jumped to 33.4% in 2003 as several high value contracts were awarded to foreign firms 
in technical, scientific and consulting services (category 14), a single category that accounts 
for more than half of all services procured above-threshold by Switzerland. In fact, if we 
exclude this category, then the share of foreign procurement in services purchased by Swiss 
central government entities would be close to the 4.4% mean again. Unfortunately, 2003 is the 
last year for which data on government procurement is available in the case of Switzerland and 
it is therefore not possible to know whether or not it signals a change in the trend of Swiss 
services procurement. We therefore regard the year as an outlier and omit it from our statistical 
analyses of Swiss services procurement.  
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Figure 1: A Snapshot of Country Procurement Patterns 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Japan AT/Total (%) Swiss AT/Total (%)
Japan Svs AT/Total (%) Swiss Svs AT/Total (%)
Japan Svs AT/Total AT (%) Swiss Svs AT/Total AT (%)
Japan Svs FP/Svs AT (%) Swiss Svs FP/Svs AT (%)
Japan Svs Non-LT/Svs AT (%) Swiss Svs Non-LT/Svs AT (%)
 
                 Source: WTO (various years); own calculations 
 
4.1.  Japanese services procurement  
 
We begin by looking at Japanese submissions on services procurement averaged over 1997-98 
and 2002-03 and compare both the percentage number and value of contracts awarded to 
foreign firms as well as those awarded using non-limited tendering methods during these 
periods in Tables 1 and 2. We consider all services, including construction, included by Japan 
in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the GPA; the list is provided in Annex Table 2 of this 
paper. 
 
Table 1 reports for 1997-98 and for 2002-03 the average number of services contracts that 
were awarded above-the-threshold, the number of these contracts that were awarded to foreign 
bidders, and the number of above-the-threshold contracts where limited tendering procedures 
were not used. Columns VIII and IX of this table report the proportion of contracts awarded to 
foreigners in 1997-98, 2002-03 and columns XI and XII report the proportion of contracts 
awarded in the same years without resort to limited tendering procedures. Finally, Columns X 
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and XIII, respectively, report the results from statistically testing for each service category if 
the proportion of contracts awarded to foreigners in 1997-98 was the same as that in 2002-03 
and if the proportion of above-the-threshold contracts that did not involve the use of limited 
tendering in 1997-98 was the same as that in 2002-0310.    
 
In 1997-98, there were, on average, 2180.5 services contracts awarded above the threshold, of 
which 3.4% were awarded to foreign firms. Sixty per cent of these contracts did not involve 
the use of limited tendering procedures. In 2002-03, the average number of contracts had risen 
to 3007.5, the percentage awarded to foreigners had fallen marginally to 3.2%, and the 
percentage of these contracts that did not employ limited tendering was lower at 58%. Ceteris 
paribus, these findings are not indicative of greater foreign access to Japanese services 
procurement. However, the test statistic in the bottom line of Table 1 under column X takes the 
value of 0.49, thereby failing to reject the hypothesis that the true probability of a contract 
being awarded to a foreign firm was no lower in 2002-03 than in 1997-98. Having said that, 
column X of Table 1 reveals that categories 41 (construction services) and 71 (computer-
related services), saw statistically significant reductions in the proportion of contracts awarded 
to foreign firms (at the 10 and 5% levels of significance, respectively) and these categories 
accounted for 64.2% of all services contracts awarded by number and 94.2% of all services 
contracts awarded by value during 2002-03.  
 
To examine the proposition that foreign access may have been unrealized more in larger-value 
services, we recalculated the test statistic by weighting contracts by their value in calculating 
the test statistics. The results from this recalculation suggested a statistically significant 
reduction in access to foreign suppliers only in the case of computer-related services.      
 
The final column of Table 1 reports the test statistic for the maximum proportion of purchases 
in each services category that are subject to internationally competitive bidding and as with 
                                                 
10 Formally, a one tail test is being performed here on two computed proportions. The null hypothesis is that the true 
value of the proportions for 1997 and 1998 and for 2002 and 2003 are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
former exceeds the latter. We assume that the samples are drawn from the same population so have equal variances 
and we calculate the variance from the pooled estimate of standard deviation.  Value of the test statistic, which is 
normally distributed, above 1.645 (1.282) indicates that there is a 95 (90) percent or more chance that in fact the true 
proportion in 2002-03 is smaller than in 1997-98. 
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foreign share in procurement, the finding in the bottom row does not support the contention 
that the proportion of above-threshold procurement contracts subject to internationally 
competitive bidding fell over time. However, once again, individual categories suggest such 
reductions as in the case of freight transport (57), enhanced fax (65) and repair services (77), 
all statistically significant at 5%. On the other hand, the value of the test statistic in Column 
XIII also suggests that the proportion of above-threshold procurement contracts subject to 
internationally competitive bidding actually increased over time in the case of other land 
transport (53), on-line info &/or data processing (67), advertising (73) and building cleaning 
services (75). 
 
To look at the role of larger-value services, we again recalculated the test statistic by weighting 
contracts by value. The results from this recalculation suggested a statistically significant 
reduction in internationally competitive bidding for services on the whole (significant at 10%) 
as well as for the individual categories of enhanced fax (65), computer-related (71), market-
research (72) and repair services (77). Thus, both potential and actual foreign access to the 
Japanese government procurement market may have been unrealized more in larger-value 
services.   
Table 1: Japanese services contracts by number
 
 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Values exceeding 1.645 in columns X and XIII denote rejection of the null hypothesis (non-decline in foreign 
procurement and use of non-LT over time) at the 5% level of significance (3) Data is averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Services Avg. 1997-98 Avg. 2002-03 Avg. 1997-98 Avg. 2002-03
Category AT Foreigners Non-LT AT Foreigners Non-LT FP (% ) FP (% ) Test statistic ICB (% ) ICB (% ) Test statistic
41 552.5 3 448.5 559 0.5 449.5 0.5 0.1 1.35 81.2 80.4 0.32
42 14.5 0 3 53 0 15.5 0.0 0.0 20.7 29.2 -0.65
51 0.5 0 0.5 6 0 5.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 91.7 0.21
52 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 np 0.0 np
53 34 0 4.5 54.5 0 16.5 0.0 0.0 13.2 30.3 -1.83
54 14 0 14 7 0 7 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
56 2 0 1 14.5 1 9 0.0 6.9 -0.38 50.0 62.1 -0.33
57 8 0 6 26.5 0 9 0.0 0.0 75.0 34.0 2.05
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
61 0 0 0 3.5 0 1.5 np 0.0 np 42.9
62 0 0 0 1 0 1 np 0.0 np 100.0
63 10 2 0 20 4 2 20.0 20.0 0.00 0.0 10.0 -1.04
64 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
65 2 0 1 5 0 0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 1.71
66 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
67 7.5 0.5 0 33 2 15 6.7 6.1 0.06 0.0 45.5 -2.33
71 766 65 303 1370.5 83.5 548.5 8.5 6.1 2.09 39.6 40.0 -0.21
72 3.5 0 2.5 13.5 1 5.5 0.0 7.4 -0.52 71.4 40.7 1.03
73 220 2.5 34.5 136.5 1.5 48 1.1 1.1 0.03 15.7 35.2 -4.24
74 29 0 28.5 79 0 75.5 0.0 0.0 98.3 95.6 0.66
75 261 0 245.5 335 0 324.5 0.0 0.0 94.1 96.9 -1.66
76 60 0 50 108 0 92 0.0 0.0 83.3 85.2 -0.32
77 148.5 2 116.5 114 2.5 69.5 1.3 2.2 -0.52 78.5 61.0 3.09
78 46.5 0 42.5 67.5 0 58.5 0.0 0.0 91.4 86.7 0.78
Total 2180.5 75 1301.5 3007.5 96 1753.5 3.4 3.2 0.49 59.7 58.3 1.00
~~~~Avg. 1997-98~~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2002-03~~~~
 
Source: WTO (various years); own calculations 
Looking next at contract values (averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 and expressed in real 
terms using the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator) in Table 2, we see that Japanese services 
procurement fell by roughly 25% from USD 14.8 bn to USD 11 bn over 1997-8, 2002-3. The 
share of foreign procurement dropped from 1.3 to 1.1%, while the use of non-limited tendering 
fell from 71.3 to 69.4%. Construction, followed by computer-related services, dominates 
services procurement in Japan, together accounting for 95% of all services contracts in value, 
but the average above-threshold values for both these services fell over time. Further, fewer of 
these services were awarded to foreign suppliers in 2002-03 than in 1997-98. On the other 
hand, the use of non-limited tendering increased slightly in the case of construction services 
but declined sharply for computer-related services, suggesting a net constriction in the market 
open to international competition. 
Table 2: Japanese services contracts by value
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
(Value real USD mn)
Services categories AT FP (% ) ICB (% ) AT FP (% ) ICB (% ) UFP UICB
41 12430.3 0.4 76.9 8638.4 0.0 81.3 2799.7 -37834.9
42 106.2 0.0 3.2 82.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 -1196.2
51 0.2 0.0 100.0 60.8 0.0 99.8 0.0 9.7
52 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 np np
53 26.0 0.0 15.6 37.9 0.0 28.5 0.0 -490.0
54 19.8 0.0 100.0 8.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
55 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
56 1.0 0.0 50.3 11.4 6.4 72.3 -73.3 -252.0
57 6.2 0.0 68.8 19.4 0.0 48.9 0.0 386.3
58 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
61 0.0 100.0 100.0 1.7 0.0 49.7 165.5 83.2
62 0.0 np np 0.4 0.0 100.0
63 5.8 22.2 0.0 9.3 10.2 3.1 112.3 -28.7
64 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 -256.9 0.0 82.3
65 0.7 0.0 45.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 56.7
66 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
67 8.5 9.8 -12.8 41.6 9.5 14.7 13.2 -1141.2
71 1811.0 8.1 40.2 1797.7 6.3 16.6 3182.3 42354.0
72 1.5 0.0 79.6 9.9 3.5 16.8 -34.3 619.8
73 135.7 0.3 13.5 104.5 1.2 36.5 -97.6 -2399.9
74 24.3 0.0 99.3 17.1 0.0 94.4 0.0 84.2
75 135.3 0.0 94.8 108.4 0.0 92.8 0.0 220.0
76 26.2 0.0 82.7 45.4 0.0 82.5 0.0 10.6
77 102.6 2.2 69.1 60.1 4.6 57.5 -143.7 696.2
78 13.0 0.0 72.4 20.3 0.0 83.8 0.0 -231.2
Total 14854.8 1.3 71.3 11076.9 1.1 69.4 1960.8 21303.3
~~~~~~Avg. 1997-98~~~~~~ ~~~~~~Avg. 2002-03~~~~~~
 
 
Source: WTO (various years); own calculations 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Categories 41 and 71 reported large-value contracts  
(3) Data is averaged over 1997-98 and 2002-03 (4) Contract values in SDR converted to real US dollar using the 
SDR-USD exchange rate and the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator 
 
These declining metrics together translate into an unrealized foreign market access of USD 
1.96 bn and an unrealized internationally competitive bidding worth USD 21.3 bn (reported in 
columns VIII and IX of Table 2). These are very large amounts - for instance, had the shares of 
foreigner-won and non-LT-awarded contracts in above-threshold contracts by value not 
declined over time, foreign services procurement in 2002-03 would have been more than 15 
times higher (ratio of total UFP to total actual FP in 2002-03) and the value of contracts open 
to ICB would have been almost three times larger (ratio of total UICB to total actual ICB in 
2002-03). 
 
4.2.   Swiss services procurement  
 
In the case of Switzerland, considering the year 2003 to be a statistical outlier, we 
conduct analogous analyses comparing Swiss submissions on services procurement 
averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02. Data on Swiss contracts numbers is reported in 
Table 3 and on contracts value in Table 4. We consider both non-construction 
(categories 1-18) and construction (categories 1-8) services included by Switzerland in 
Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the GPA; the list is provided in Annex Table 3 of 
this paper. 
 
From Table 3 we see that in 1996-97, there were 264.5 services contracts awarded on 
average by the Swiss above threshold, of which 9.3% were awarded to foreign firms. 
66.7% of these contracts did not involve the use of limited tendering procedures. In 
2001-02, the average number of contracts had risen to 352.5, but the percentage 
awarded to foreigners had fallen to 4.5%, and the percentage of these contracts that 
did not employ limited tendering was also marginally lower at 66.5%. Ceteris paribus, 
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therefore, a la Japan, these findings are not indicative of greater foreign access to Swiss 
services procurement.  
 
Supporting this contention, the test statistic  in the bottom line under column X of 
Table 3 takes the value of 2.34, suggesting that the true proportion of contracts 
awarded to foreign firms was lower in 2001-02 than in 1996-97. (The same result holds 
true for total construction and total non-constructions services, the latter significant at 
10%.) On the other hand, the test statistic in the bottom line of column XIII does not 
point to statistically significant reductions in the proportion of above threshold 
contacts awarded using non-LT methods, though categories 2 (land transport) and 15 
(advertising) do actually suggest such reductions (at the 10 and 5% levels of 
significance, respectively).   
 
The results from this analysis survive the recalculation of the test statistics to examine 
the role of the larger-value services in the evolution of actual and potential foreign 
access over time, which suggests that the home-bias in Swiss government 
procurement was no more in large-value services than in small-value ones.      
Table 3: Swiss services contracts by number
 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement (2) Values exceeding 1.645 in columns X and XIII denote rejection of the null hypothesis (non-decline in foreign 
procurement and use of non-LT over time) at the 5% level of significance (3) Data is averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02                          
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Avg. 1996-97 Avg. 2001-02 Avg. 1996-97 Avg. 2001-02
Categories AT Foreigners Non-LT AT Foreigners Non-LT FP (%) FP (%) Test statistic ICB (%) ICB (%) Test statistic
1 34 0.5 12.5 30.5 0.5 15.5 1.5 1.6 -0.05 36.8 50.8 -1.14
2 9 2.5 8.5 1 0 0.5 27.8 0.0 0.61 94.4 50.0 1.41
3 1.5 0.5 1.5 0 0 -1 33.3 np 100.0 np
4 0 0 0 0 0 -1 np np np np
5 0.5 0 0.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 20.0 -0.35 100.0 20.0 1.10
6 0 0 0 0 0 -0.5 np np np np
7 33 0.5 20.5 95.5 4 58.5 1.5 4.2 -0.72 62.1 61.3 0.09
8 0 0 0 1.5 0 1.5 np 0.0 np 100.0
9 1.5 0 1.5 5 0 3 0.0 0.0 100.0 60.0 0.93
10 5 0.5 1 10 0.5 2.5 10.0 5.0 0.37 20.0 25.0 -0.22
11 14.5 2.5 9.5 0 0 0 17.2 np 65.5 np
12 14 1 0.5 20.5 1 16 7.1 4.9 0.28 3.6 78.0 -4.30
13 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 np 0.0 np 0.0
14 119 11 88 132.5 8.5 96.5 9.2 6.4 0.84 73.9 72.8 0.20
15 1.5 0 1.5 10.5 0 2.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 23.8 1.85
16 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
17 0 0 0 5.5 0.5 4 np 9.1 np 72.7
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
Total non-construction 234 19 146 317 15.5 199 8.1 4.9 1.55 62.4 62.8 -0.09
1 7.5 0 7.5 4 0 4 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
2 5 5 5 11 0.5 11 100.0 4.5 3.73 100.0 100.0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 np np np np
5 2 0.5 2 0 0 0 25.0 np 100.0 np
6 8 0 8 5 0 5 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
7 8 0 8 3 0 3 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
8 0 0 0 12.5 0 12.5 np 0.0 np 100.0
Total construction 30.5 5.5 30.5 35.5 0.5 35.5 18.0 1.4 2.34 100.0 100.0
All services 264.5 24.5 176.5 352.5 16 234.5 9.3 4.5 2.34 66.7 66.5 0.05
~~~~Avg. 1996-97~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2001-02~~~~
 
Source: WTO (various years); own calculations 
In terms of contract values reported in Table 4 (averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02 and 
expressed in real terms using the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator), average Swiss services 
procurement (excluding that in construction) rose by nearly half from USD 204 mn to USD 
305 mn over 1996-7, 2001-2, while construction services witnessed a more than three-fold 
increase from USD 16.5 mn to USD 53.9 mn. Within non-construction services, the share of 
foreign procurement in services fell from 5.2 to 4% while the use of non-limited tendering fell 
marginally from 78 to 77.5%. Construction services, driven primarily by general building 
construction work (category 2), witnessed a huge fall in foreign procurement from 23.3 to 
3.6%. Data also suggests that the Swiss government did not resort to limited tendering 
practices in the award of construction services contracts. On the whole, the share of foreign 
procurement in services fell from 6.6 to 3.9% while the use of non-limited tendering increased 
from 80 to 81%. Technical, scientific and consulting services (categories 12 and 14), followed 
by computer-related (category 7), construction and repair services (category 1), dominate 
Swiss services procurement, accounting for more than 90% of all services contracts in value 
terms, and barring repair services (category 1), the average above-threshold procurement for 
the other major categories increased over time. The foreign procurement share in these services 
fell sharply for technical, scientific and consulting (category 12) and construction services 
while the use of non-limited tendering fell in the case of technical, scientific and consulting 
services (category 14).  
 
The results from counterfactual analysis in the case of Swiss services procurement, reported in 
Columns VIII and IX of Table 4, translate into an unrealized foreign market access of USD 
953 mn, a value that is proportionately even larger than the comparable figure for Japan: had 
the shares of foreigner-won above-threshold contracts by value not declined over time, foreign 
services procurement in 2001-02 would have been nearly 68 times higher (ratio of total actual 
UFP to total actual FP in 2001-02)! On the other hand, UICB is -418.5 mn, which suggests that 
the de jure openness increased. However, this result emanates from the Swiss government's 
non-use of limited tendering in awarding construction services contracts. If we consider only 
non-construction services, UICB is USD 176.5 mn - the value of non-construction services 
contracts open to ICB would have been 75% more (ratio of total actual UICB in non-
construction to total actual ICB in non-construction in 2001-02) had the use of non-LT in these 
services not declined over 1996-97, 2001-02.    
Table 4: Swiss services contracts by value
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
(Value real USD mn)
Categories AT FP (%) ICB (%) AT FP (%) ICB (%) UFP UICB
1 20.7 0.5 12.8 19.6 3.1 44.8 -50.6 -627.2
2 9.8 7.8 95.8 0.3 0.0 50.6 2.0 11.7
3 1.5 6.1 100.0 0.0 np np
4 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
5 0.1 0.0 100.0 2.8 4.2 -56.7 -12.0 445.8
6 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
7 15.2 0.7 46.8 44.9 8.8 61.7 -366.7 -665.8
8 0.0 np np 0.3 0.0 100.0
9 3.4 0.0 100.0 3.2 0.0 86.0 0.0 45.4
10 1.4 7.4 13.9 4.4 13.5 45.4 -27.2 -138.8
11 20.5 19.6 76.2 0.0 np np
12 1.6 82.6 56.4 82.5 0.7 98.8 6755.2 -3498.1
13 0.0 np np 0.7 0.0 -12.9
14 129.5 3.2 91.2 137.4 4.5 84.3 -175.3 950.4
15 0.4 0.0 100.0 6.8 0.0 3.0 0.0 656.6
16 0.2 0.0 100.0 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
17 0.0 np np 2.0 6.8 74.2
18 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
Total non-construction 204.4 5.2 78.1 305.1 4.0 77.5 379.5 176.5
1 0.6 0.0 100.0 19.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
2 3.7 100.0 100.0 27.2 7.1 100.0 2528.0 0.0
3 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
4 0.0 np np 0.0 np np
5 4.3 3.8 100.0 0.0 np np
6 2.0 0.0 100.0 1.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
7 5.8 0.0 100.0 0.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 np np 5.4 0.0 100.0
Total construction 16.5 23.3 100.0 53.9 3.6 100.0 1065.7 noLT
All services 220.8 6.6 79.7 359.0 3.9 80.9 953.1 -418.5
~~~~Avg. 1996-97~~~~ ~~~~Avg. 2001-02~~~~
 
 
Source: WTO (various years); own calculations 
Note: (1) “np” denotes no AT procurement and “no LT” denotes non-use of limited tendering (2) Categories 1, 7, 
12 and 14 among non-construction and categories 1and 2 among construction services reported large-value 
contracts (3) Data is averaged over 1996-97 and 2001-02 (4) Contract values in SDR converted to real US dollar 
using the SDR-USD exchange rate and the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator. 
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4.3. Private-public purchase differentials 
 
Finally, results from the counterfactual analysis against the private sector for both 
Japan and Switzerland are reported in Table 5. Data on sectoral output and imports 
for the two countries is taken from the OECD's STAN database for structural analysis 
and trade in services by service category, respectively. Unfortunately, sector-specific 
data on imports and gross output is not available for all services categories; hence, the 
individual services categories for the two countries have been aggregated into 
broader categories (the composition is shown in brackets against each category in 
Table 5) to enable better analysis. Even then, the absence of import data for Swiss 
construction and computer-related services over our sample period meant that the 
counterfactuals even for these broad categories could not be calculated in the case of 
Switzerland.     
Table 5: Private-public purchase differentials
 
Categories  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Construction (41) 28.7 72.7 30.4 37.8 31.9 149.6 147.7
Other business (42, 72-73, 75-78)  12.0 17.5 6.8 6.5 9.1 24.7 31.8
Transportation (53-57) 3.8 5.1 3.0 4.6 4.8 21.4 22.0
Communication (58, 61-65) -0.7 -1.7 -1.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
Computer-related (66-67, 71) 12.6 -156.1 -69.0 -71.5 -70.2 -33.6 -22.5
Total 56.4 -62.4 -30.1 -22.9 -24.8 161.5 178.1
Categories  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Transportation (2-4) 1.2 1.1 -0.5 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2
Communication (5) 0.01 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Financial (6) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other business (1, 8-18) -5.1 -8.7 -8.2 -8.6 -10.1 -5.2 -130.0
Total -3.8 -7.4 -8.4 -8.1 -10.1 -5.0 -129.6
Japan (values in real USD mn)
Switzerland (values in real USD mn)
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Source: WTO (various years); OECD (various years); own calculations  
Note: (1) Import data was not available for construction and computer-related services in the case of 
Switzerland; hence, the counterfactuals are missing for these categories (2) Financial services are not 
included by Japan in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the GPA (3) The numbers in brackets against each 
broad category indicate the individual services categories listed in Annex Tables 2 and 3 that were 
aggregated to form that broad category   
 
Table 5 reveals that Japanese services in these categories, especially construction, have 
seen large private-public purchase differentials over time, a finding that is consistent 
with Baldwin's (1970, 1984) "neutrality proposition" and the home-bias in Japanese 
services procurement. The differential for total services was a positive USD 56.4 mn in 
1997 but became negative in the next four years on account of rising public purchase 
of computer-related services from foreign suppliers, a category which therefore 
showed negative differentials from 1998 to 2003. The differentials were always 
positive in the case of construction, other business and transportation services and 
also showed huge increases in these categories in 2002 and 2003, which offset the 
negative differential in computer-related services during these years to yield a 
positive differential for services on the whole. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
differential itself increased three-fold from 1997 to 2003. Thus, had the private sector 
propensity to import been applied to government procurement decisions in these 
services, the foreign share of procurement would have been much higher. 
Communication services, on the other hand, always report a negative differential, 
which suggests that the Japanese government was not favouring domestic firms in 
this sector.  
 
The absence of comparable data for a broader range of Swiss services renders a 
similar analysis less conclusive. Swiss services see a positive but declining differential 
for transportation services (suggesting reduced importance of the home-bias), 
effectively a zero differential for financial services (absence of above-threshold 
procurement) and a positive and nearly constant differential for communication 
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services over 2000-03 (suggesting no change over time in the importance of the home-
bias). The differential for other business services is always negative (suggesting no 
home-bias) but jumps to USD -130 mn in 2003, a result that supports the choice of this 
year as a statistical outlier in the case of Switzerland.   
 
On the whole, the results from this counterfactual analysis suggest that at least the 
Japanese government has not been purchasing as much from abroad as its private 
sector is importing from the rest of the world for the same services categories. These 
results are thus consistent with those from the preceding analyses on the home-bias in 
Japanese services procurement patterns. 
 
5.           Conclusion 
 
The results from the analyses undertaken in this paper suggest that the URGPA has 
not really been effective in increasing or even sustaining market access for foreigners 
in the procurement markets of two of its signatories – Japan and Switzerland. We 
have examined data from two of the 40 Contracting Parties to the GPA that have 
submitted detailed data in a form amenable to our statistical analysis; hence, the 
results are specific to these countries. The two cases, however, do point in the same 
direction, suggesting a home-bias in the award of government services contracts. 
 
A careful reading of the results further suggests that this may be due to a combination 
of incomplete/ineffective provisions and a weak enforcement mechanism. For 
instance, despite the requirements of Article XIX:5, only half of the 40 Contracting 
Parties have submitted procurement data to the WTO consistently over time, which 
points to weak enforcement and in turn, could be due to the absence of any punitive 
action or public censure for non-submission. From the two countries we have studied, 
there is enough argument for addressing the loopholes in the GPA (too many 
exclusions/exemptions allowed; non-price discrimination is allowed while more 
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efficient price preferences are explicitly banned) and for giving it more teeth (public 
censure for non-adherence to data reporting commitments; provision of incentives to 
whistle-blowers revealing corruption in procurement). The WTO’s Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism could also work through peer-pressure by highlighting non-
compliance with Article XIX: 5 and/or pointing out distinct breaks in past patterns of 
public procurement that signal a move towards discrimination.   
 
Finally, while the evidence of discrimination reported above may be more suggestive 
than definitive, the fact that the GPA did not increase ex-post foreign market access in 
services in these two governments’ public purchases is undeniable. Furthermore, if 
this result were repeated in all countries, it must then reflect home biases in 
government procurement, because not every country can increase its domestic 
efficiency relative to its partners. In examining actual trade data relative to 
counterfactuals, the analysis in this paper is similar to analyses examining the 
residuals from gravity models to illustrate protection in goods markets. From that 
perspective at least, our results do quite strongly suggest discrimination against 
foreign suppliers in the government procurement markets for services in the two 
countries studied and that the GPA may not be having the strong effects that many 
hoped for.      
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Annex Table 1: Statistical submissions made to the Committee on 
Government Procurement
 
Year Reporting Countries 
2009 Hong Kong, Japan, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Taiwan 
2008 Hong Kong, Japan, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, and USA 
2007 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and USA 
2006 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, and USA 
2005 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, and USA 
2004 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Norway, and USA 
2003 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, and USA 
2002 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland & USA 
2001 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA 
2000 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1999 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1998 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1997 Canada, EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1996 Canada, EC, Norway, Switzerland & USA  
1995 Hong Kong, Norway & Switzerland 
1994 Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Norway, Singapore, Sweden & Switzerland 
1993 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland & USA 
1992 
Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, 
Sweden & USA 
1991 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland & USA 
1990 
Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland & USA 
1989 
Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & 
USA 
1988 
Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & 
USA  
1987 
Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & 
USA  
1986 
Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland & 
USA  
1985 
Austria, Canada, EC, Finland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden & 
Switzerland  
 
Source: WTO (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 2: List of services procured by the Japanese
 
Japanese Classification CPC Code Services Category
41 51 Construction work
42 867 Architectural, engineering & other technical 
51 6112 Maintenance & repair  (motor vehicles)
52 6122 Maintenance & repair (motorcycles & snowmobiles)
53 712 Other land transport  
54 7213 Rental (sea-going vessels)
55 7223 Rental (non-sea-going vessels)
56 73 Air transport 
57 748 Freight transport agency 
58 7512 Courier 
61 7523 Electronic mail
62 7521 Voice mail
63 7523 On-line info & database retrieval
64 7523 Electronic data interchange (EDI)
65 7529 Enhanced fax 
66 7523 Code and protocol conversion
67 7523 On-line info &/or data processing 
71 84 Computer & related 
72 864 Market research & pub opinion polling 
73 871 Advertising 
74 87304 Armoured car 
75 874 Building-cleaning 
76 88442 Publishing & printing  
77 886 Repair (metal products & machinery)
78 94 Sewage & refuse disposal, sanitation & other EP  
 
Source: WTO (various years); UNSC (2002) 
 
  
Annex Table 3: List of services procured by the Swiss
 
Swiss 
Classification CPC Services Descriptions 
1 6112, 6122, 633, 886 Discussion to the wide direction (discussion, inspection, repairs) 
2 
712 (excd. 71235), 7512, 87304 
Land transportation, including the transportation of money and the 
mail services, except the postal traffic and rail transportation 
3 
73 (excd. 7321) 
Air transportation: Transportation of travellers and of 
merchandise, except the transportation of courier 
4 
71235, 7321 
Transportation of mail by land or by airplane (except rail 
transportation) 
5 
752 (excd. 7524, 7525, 7526) 
Telecommunications (except the services of vocal telephony, of 
telex, of radio telephony, of radio-messaging and of 
telecommunications by satellite) 
6 
811, 812, 814 
Services regarding assurance and bank services, except the 
financial services relating to the transmission, to the sale, to the 
purchase or to the transfer of titles or of other financial 
instruments, as well as services furnished by central banks 
7 84 Computer and related services  
8 862 Accounting, auditing and book-keeping services 
9 864 Market and public-opinion polling services 
10 865, 866 Management consulting and related services 
11 867 Architecture, urban installation and environmental architecture 
12 
867 
Consulting and technical services, technical integrated services, 
relevant scientific and technical consulting, technical essays and 
analyses of construction projects 
13 
867 
Works of study (auction of identical markets to several contractors 
to obtain different suggestions of solutions) 
14 
867 
Consulting and technical services, technical integrated services, 
relevant scientific and technical consulting, technical essays and 
analyses not concerning construction projects  
15 871 Advertising, information and public relations services 
16 874, 82201-82206 Cleanings of buildings and property management services  
17 88442 Edition and impression services 
18 94 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and analogous services 
Construction services 
1 511 Preparation of the sites and work-sites of construction 
2 512 Construction of buildings 
3 513 Construction of civil works  
4 514 Assembly and construction of prefabricated works 
5 515 Works of specialized businesses of construction 
6 516 Putting installations 
7 517 Secondary work and building finishing 
8 
518 
Housing and credit lease concerning equipments of construction 
or of demolition, personnel works 
 
 
Source: WTO (various years); UNSC (2002) 
Note: The table has been translated into English from French      
  
   
